American University Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 5

Article 6

2010

Salvage Awards on the Somali Coast: Who Pays for
Public and Private Rescue Efforts in Piracy Crises?
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Contracts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the
Law of the Sea Commons
Recommended Citation
Rapp, Geoffrey Christopher. "Salvage Awards on the Somali Coast: Who Pays for Public and Private Rescue Efforts in Piracy Crises?"
American University Law Review 59, no.5 ( June 2010): 1399-1423.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Salvage Awards on the Somali Coast: Who Pays for Public and Private
Rescue Efforts in Piracy Crises?
Abstract

This paper, a contribution to the "Troubled Waters: Combating Modern Piracy with the Rule of Law"
symposium, explores the question of who pays for rescue efforts associated with maritime piracy. The paper
explores the availability of admiralty law's salvage awards to governmental and non-governmental actors who
intervene to rescue vessels and crew from pirates. Such awards provide an unusual incentive to rescue,
traditionally unavailable for land-based rescue, but may raise complicated questions of policy and
international law. The paper concludes by comparing salvage awards to a recent trend in American states to
adopt "Search and Rescue" expense statutes allowing governments to charge those rescued from land-based
wilderness perils for the costs associated with intervention.
Keywords

Salvage Law, piracy law, Indonesia’s Malacca Straits, coast of the Horn of Africa, salvage awards

This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol59/iss5/6

RAPP.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX.THIRD (DO NOT DELETE)

6/22/2010 7:57 PM

SALVAGE AWARDS ON
THE SOMALI COAST:
WHO PAYS FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RESCUE EFFORTS IN PIRACY CRISES?
GEOFFREY CHRISTOPHER RAPP∗

Pirates could happen to anyone.
1
—Tom Stoppard, ROSENCRANTZ & GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD
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INTRODUCTION
Observers of the spate of piracy crises along the coast of the Horn
2
of Africa over the past two years and near Indonesia’s Malacca Straits
in the 1990s have no doubt wondered how a massive freighter, with
dozens of crewmembers traveling at a high rate of speed, can be
hijacked by a fishing boat staffed by pirates armed with nothing more
3
than small arms. It may be surprising that the crews of shipping
vessels do not defend themselves or simply outrun their much smaller
4
attackers.
Corporate directives and the mandate of shipping firms’ “hull
policies” may provide the explanation. Even a small chance of a total
loss for a ship (or massive liability in the event of a petrochemical
5
spill or similar disaster) far outweighs a seven-figure payout to
6
modern-day pirate gangs. Therefore, cautious corporations direct
7
their captains to enforce a policy of zero resistance, and insurance
companies—before offering piracy clauses in primary insurance
8
contracts covering vessels and cargo (hull policies) or in separate
2. Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantanamo on the Sea”: The Difficulties of Prosecuting
Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CAL. L. REV. 243, 243 (“In the summer of 2008, an epidemic
of piracy broke out in the Gulf of Aden, off the Horn of Africa, with record numbers
of ships attacked and captured.”).
3. John S. Burnett, Grand Theft Nautical, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2008, at A39
(questioning how “a dozen pirates in two puny boats armed with rifles and a grenade
launcher” are able to board a ship “seven times the size of the Titanic and longer
than the Chrysler building is tall”).
4. But see Somalia: North Korea Ship Foils Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2009, at A12
(recounting that some ships have successfully evaded pirate attacks, even in the face
of rocket-propelled-grenade fire).
5. Burnett, supra note 3, at A39 (“No one wants to contemplate the effects of an
exploding tanker laden with 300,000 tons of crude oil . . . . If that amount of crude
were to escape, the environmental damage to the Indian Ocean and East African
coast, upon which millions earn their living, would be catastrophic.”).
6. While the amount of ransom paid to pirates is often shrouded in secrecy,
recent payments “are widely believed to be in the range of $1,000,000 to $2,000,000,
or more, per event.” Jonathan Spencer, Hull Insurance and General Average—Some
Current Issues, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1258 (2008). By the time the ransom is
assembled (in the form of small bills) and transported to the “drop site,” total
expenses could “easily approach half a million dollars.” Id.
7. Merchant sailors once commonly carried small arms. However, concerns
about liability and safety have led most commercial shipping companies to ban crews
from possessing weapons. Keith Bradsher, Rescue Revives Debate Over Arming Crews,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, at A8. Today, industry groups advocate a policy of “no
resistance” by vessel captains when boarded by pirates. CHAMBER SHIPPING OF
AMERICA, BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO DETER PIRACY IN THE GULF OF ADEN AND OFF
THE COAST OF SOMALIA 2–10 (2009), http://www.knowships.org/images/RoundtableAnti-Piracy-Best-Management-Practices.pdf.
8. Michael H. Passman, Interpreting Sea Piracy Clauses in Marine Insurance
Contracts, 40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 59, 60–61 (2009) (“Since marine insurance began, loss
caused by piracy has either been specifically covered or excluded. . . . [L]oss caused
by pirates was traditionally covered as a separate named peril in the standard hull
policy.”).
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10

(and increasingly pricey) piracy insurance policies —may demand
that their insured avoid the risks of total loss associated with violent
resistance and instead submit to a pirate’s efforts to take control of a
11
ship.
Moreover, because insurance policies cover the total loss of a ship
and its cargo but often do not allow claims to be filed for expenses
12
associated with rescuing or averting loss, insured shipping
companies may rationally choose to avoid any significant expenditure
of resources in rescuing their vessels from pirate attacks. This is the
case in spite of the relatively low cost of a typical resistance effort.
Shipping vessels could be effectively armed or include armed guards
at a fraction of the cost of a typical military-style rescue mission like
13
the one staged earlier this year by the U.S. Navy.
9. See Keith Bradsher, Insurance Premiums Rise as Threats to Ships Grow, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 2005, at C5 (“[M]any insurers have begun charging extra premiums for ship
passage through the strait [of Malacca].”).
10. Many such policies are offered under the rubric of kidnap and ransom (K &
R) insurance, “a line of business that has existed for decades” and “is now being
extended to vessels and their crews” at increasingly higher premium rates. Spencer,
supra note 6, at 1259. Others are offered under “war risk” policies. Passman, supra
note 8, at 61 (“Under these new clauses, coverage for piracy is included only by
purchasing a separate war risk policy, paying an additional premium, and submitting
to additional reporting requirements.”). For an example of a separate “war risk”
policy covering piracy, see generally AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MARINE UNDERWRITERS,
AIMU WAR RISK OPEN POLICY (12/2/1993) COMPARED WITH THE LONDON INSTITUTE
WAR CLAUSES (CARGO)(1/1/1982),
http://www.aimu.org/aimuforms/WarRiskOpenPolicy.pdf (providing information
about risks covered under an AIMU policy, as well as the type of coverage offered).
11. War risk clauses in hull policies often exclude liability for damage resulting
from “capture, seizure, arrest, restraint or detainment.” Daryl G. Parker, Annotation,
War Risks, in MARINE P & I POLICY ANNOTATIONS: ANNOTATIONS OF THE AMERICAN
STEAMSHIP OWNERS MUTUAL PROTECTION AND INDEMNITY ASSOCIATION FORM POLICY
105, 105–06 (1982). Damage sustained during resistance to pirate operations might
therefore be excluded from the primary policy coverage for most shipping vessels.
For example, most policies exclude coverage for any “voyage or . . . trade” that is
deemed “imprudent, unsafe, unduly hazardous or improper.” Because the legality of
armed security on merchant vessels is unclear, and the industry recommends
passivity in the face of pirate boarding parties, it might be that any damage resulting
from resistance efforts would be excluded as the result of “unsafe” activity. See Rhys
Clift, Partner, Hill Dickinson LLP, Piracy a Brief Overview (Oct. 15, 2009), available
at http://www.iumi.com/index.cfm?id=7295 (citing Best Maritime Practices’
suggestion to cooperate with pirates).
12. See generally Spencer, supra note 6, at 1230–31 (discussing continued
uncertainty concerning whether rescue and salvage expenses must be covered by
maritime insurance policies).
13. See Robert D. McFadden & Scott Shane, Navy Rescues Captain, Killing 3 Pirate
Captors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, at A1 (describing the Naval rescue of the Maersk
Alabama). The cost of military operations to rescue vessels and crew are difficult to
estimate, but are likely more than the cost of hiring embarked security forces to
protect merchant vessels. See infra note 161. Those costs are also hard to determine
precisely, but many security companies advertise discounted services and claim to
offer cost-effective armed security for merchant vessels. For instance, Espada
Logistics and Security Group charges $54,000 for a three-day escort vessel off the
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This Article addresses the question of “who pays” for the cost of
these potential rescue efforts, which are a seemingly inefficient
expenditure of wealth given the lower prevention costs available.
Under long-established principles of admiralty law, one who
voluntarily undertakes to rescue another vessel from “maritime peril”
14
is entitled to a salvage award for their efforts. This award—typically
15
in the range of four percent to twenty-five percent of the value of
the vessel—is calculated based upon the risk associated with the
16
rescue and a number of other factors.
The question implicit in any discussion of salvage awards is whether
piracy amounts to a threat sufficient to trigger admiralty law’s special
salvage award. If ships themselves do not defend or make any
attempt to defend against pirates, are they really in “peril” sufficient
to trigger an obligation to pay a salvage award? In particular, is a
pirated ship in “maritime peril” if its owner or insurer believes that
payment of a ransom will lead to the ship’s safe return? Are there any
other legal theories—such as quasi-contract—that could be used by a
potential rescuer to claim a reward for its services?
A second set of questions surrounds which parties might claim
salvage awards in piracy rescue cases and who would pay such awards.
Can governmental actors recover such awards? Private vigilante
crews? Can such awards be sought solely from vessel owners, or could
insurance companies, arguably responsible for the piracy crisis due to
likely interpretation of insurance contracts and policy guidance
17
offered to insured, also be held responsible?
May cargo owners
recover through established principles of general average
18
Moreover, to what extent does the possibility of
contribution?
Gulf of Aden. See Africa Shipping Line, Security Group Espada Now On Hire Along
East Coast of Africa, http://asldubai.blogspot.com/2010/01/security-group-espadanow-on-hire-along.html (last visited 22 Apr. 2010). ISSG Holdings offers armed onboard security for $12,000 per day and promises that “smaller shipping companies
[can] take advantage of low rates as well.” See PRLog, Anti Piracy Maritime Security
Costs Disclosed, http://www.prlog.org/10561580-anti-piracy-maritime-security-costsdisclosed.html (last visited 22 Apr. 2010).
14. See, e.g., The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1879) (setting forth the three
elements of a valid salvage claim under admiralty law).
15. See Margate Shipping Co. v. M/V JA Orgeron, 143 F.3d 976, 993–95 (5th Cir.
1998) (providing a chart that lists the salvage award for rescuing vessels in terms of
percentage of value of the vessel and recognizing that the award usually amounts to
four to twenty-five percent of the value of the ship).
16. See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869) (listing six factors to be
considered when determining the amount of the salvage award).
17. See infra Part II.B.2. (describing how insurance shipping policies create
incentives for crews to avoid resisting attacks by pirates).
18. See Barnard v. Adams, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 270, 303 (1850) (explaining that
general average contribution is founded in the law of equity and requires that there
be (1) an imminent and inevitable danger to the crew, cargo, and ship; (2) a transfer
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salvage awards create opportunities for private actors—some might
call them vigilantes—to protect and rescue ships from pirates where
19
international organizations and conventions have seemingly failed?
Finally, this Article also addresses the policy implications of this legal
framework: Are vessels in more danger, or less, given what the law
says to potential rescuers about their rights to recovery?
Useful comparisons can be drawn between the issues arising in
connection with salvage awards in maritime piracy cases with a recent
spate of “search and rescue” expense statutes passed by American
20
states. Although not applicable in the choke-points of the seven seas
likely to be targeted by pirates, these statutes provide a similar
mechanism for holding those responsible for a rescue to account for
the costs of that rescue. A comparative consideration will help flush
out the policy implications to the application of salvage awards in
piracy cases.
This Article aims to make an important contribution to the
literature on the contemporary problem of maritime piracy. Too
often, legal scholars have exclusively focused either on the
21
international law framework for controlling piracy, or on the
22
23
Admiralty
question of whether piracy amounts to “terrorism.”

of danger from the whole to a particular portion of the whole; and (3) a successful
attempt to avoid the danger).
19. See Ethan C. Stiles, Note, Reforming Current International Law to Combat Modern
Sea Piracy, 27 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 299, 316–20 (2004) (stating that private
antipiracy efforts may supplement state-sponsored efforts where the state does not
have the resources to combat piracy).
20. See infra Part III (describing recent state statutes that authorize recovery of
expenses associated with various rescues).
21. See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 2, at 246 (arguing that international law
limits the power of nations to prosecute and detain pirates); see also George D. Gabel,
Jr., Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guidelines as an International Solution to Modern-Day
Piracy, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (2007) (recommending guidelines to deal with
piracy’s growing effects on international trade); LT Mike Madden, USN, Trading the
Shield of Sovereignty for the Scales of Justice: A Proposal for Reform of International Sea Piracy
Laws, 21 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 139, 148 (2009) (arguing that existing international
conventions regulating piracy need to be updated); Steven R. Swanson, Terrorism,
Piracy, and the Alien Tort Statute, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 159, 162, 202 (2009) (comparing the
development of international law in the context of terrorism and piracy). But see
Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval
Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 40 (2007) (arguing that existing
international law provides an adequate framework for antipiracy efforts).
22. I would argue that the “terror creep” language aims to add emotional appeal
to the case for greater antipirate efforts, but offers little hope of incentivizing actors,
private or public, to combat this problem.
23. See, e.g., Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More is
Needed,
FORDHAM
INT’L
L.J.
(forthcoming
2010),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1468021 (referring to pirates as “sea-terrorists”); Jason
Power, Note, Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for National and International Security,
10 BARRY L. REV. 111, 115–16 (2008) (comparing the definitions and history of piracy
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law—once a core course in most American law schools but now a
24
forgotten or neglected subject —has received little attention in
connection with its potential role to incentivize private actors to step
up where governments have failed to combat the emerging threats to
commerce on the world’s waterways.
I.

SALVAGE LAW
A. Basics

1.

Substance
The “law of salvage” is “[d]eeply ingrained in British and American
law,” though its origins can be found in the legal codes of early
25
Mediterranean seafaring city-states. The purpose of a salvage award
26
is to encourage rescue, and experience has proven that a monetary
27
award is “the most efficacious method of achieving that end.” The
costs and dangers associated with maritime salvage and rescue efforts,
without the promise of a monetary return, render it likely that “aid
28
would not be forthcoming. . . .”
29
A “salvor” is “anyone who saves maritime property from a peril.”
30
As one author put it, “just about anybody can be a salvor.” Courts

and terrorism to suggest that, because of their similarities and interaction with one
another, the two comprise “Maritime Terrorism”).
24. Admiralty law is “[r]arely taught in American law schools” and “even more
rarely discussed by non-specialists in the academic community . . . .” Ernest A.
Young, It’s Just Water: Toward the Normalization of Admiralty, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 469,
472 (2004). Sara Stadler’s survey of law school curricula led her to conclude that
admiralty law is long dead in law schools: “[T]he doctor called a ‘code’ in admiralty
law more than a decade ago.” Sara K. Stadler, The Bulls and Bears of Law Teaching, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV 25, 75 (2006).
25. Angela Joy Davis, Beyond Repatriation: A Proposal for the Equitable Restitution of
Cultural Property, 33 UCLA L. REV. 642, 658 (1985).
26. Int’l Aircraft Recovery, L.L.C. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned
Aircraft, 218 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that the need to facilitate
efficient rescue means that the prior assent of the owner or master is not required);
see also Davis, supra note 25, at 659 (explaining that in order to receive a salvage
award the salvor must have voluntarily acted to save the owner’s property, and must
have succeeded in doing so).
27. Lawrence Jarett, The Life Salvor Problem in Admiralty, 63 YALE L.J. 779, 781
(1954).
28. Note, Calculating and Allocating Salvage Liability, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1896, 1899
(1986) [hereinafter Calculating Salvage Liability].
29. ROBERT FORCE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 155
(2004), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/admiralt.pdf/$file/admiralt.pdf.
30. Jason Parent, No Duty to Save Lives, No Reward for Rescue: Is that Truly the
Current State of Salvage Law?, 12 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 87, 101 (2006).
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have construed the term salvor liberally in salvage claims to reward
31
the “perilous service” of a maritime rescuer.
Three basic elements must be proven in order to trigger a salvage
32
award. “First there must be a service to maritime property which is
33
in real or impending danger.” The danger must be such that a
prudent captain would have accepted salvage efforts at a price
34
equivalent to the award eventually imposed. However, because of
the immediacy associated with maritime peril, and the number of
potential contracting parties, it is simply infeasible to imagine the
35
ship’s master actually negotiating for rescue services. Moreover, any
such contract might be unenforceable in light of the contract’s
36
potentially exploitative nature. Salvage awards provide a post-hoc
37
substitute for contract in this high-transaction-cost setting. In order
to be eligible to pursue a salvage award, both the rescuer (the salvor)
38
and the ship or cargo rescued (the property) must be in danger.
The second element requires that “the service must be voluntary in
39
nature,” rather than an obligation imposed by contract. Any
contractual or customary duty to provide a rescue would defeat a
40
claim for a salvage award. Instead, a party contractually obligated to
rescue a ship would be limited to the compensation spelled out in the
41
contract’s terms.

31. FORCE, supra note 29, at 154 (noting that public policy requires a salvage
award for those who expose themselves to dangerous situations to provide aid to
shipowners).
32. Jarett, supra note 27, at 780.
33. Id.
34. Margate Shipping Co. v. M/V JA Orgeron, 143 F.3d 976, 986 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“In an ideal world, every meeting of salvor and salvee would result in a freely
negotiated contract for salvage services priced at a competitive level. In the real
world, most meetings of salvor and salvee cannot be resolved in this fashion.” (citing
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 89 (1978))).
35. Landes & Posner, supra note 34, at 100.
36. See generally Shahar Lifshitz, Distress Exploitation Contracts in the Shadow of No
Duty to Rescue, 86 N.C. L. REV. 315, 324–37 (2008) (discussing the lack of clarity
surrounding when duress and unconscionability could be used to invalidate
contracts entered into by those in distress).
37. See Margate Shipping, 143 F.3d at 986 (discussing the economics of salvage
awards).
38. See Davis, supra note 25, at 659 (distinguishing between salvage awards and
the doctrine of quasi-contract).
39. Jarett, supra note 27, at 780.
40. See Calculating Salvage Liability, supra note 28, at 1897 (noting that seamen
and tug-owners may have a contractual duty to keep the ship afloat and thus would
be ineligible for a salvage award).
41. Capt. Bruce D. Landrum, USMC, Salvage Claims for the Navy and Coast Guard:
A Unified Approach, 38 NAVAL L. REV. 213, 214 (1989).
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Third, the salvage effort must be at least partially successful in
42
A “fruitless rescue” will go
saving the property in peril.
43
unrewarded. One reason for this is that salvage award claims were
historically brought in rem, and a salvor’s claim amounted to a lien
44
against the property saved.
If the rescuer’s efforts were
unsuccessful, of course, there would be no property against which a
lien could attach. Requiring payment where an effort is unsuccessful
might also impose an unduly harsh burden on the owner of the vessel
45
unsuccessfully rescued. If successful, the rescuer acquires a present
46
possessory property right in the subject of the rescue. This lien
takes on the highest priority with respect to the property—ship or
47
cargo—that was saved.
The amount of the award is not limited to the expenses incurred in
48
the course of the rescue efforts. The degree of danger to human
life and property, the value of the property saved, the danger posed
to the rescuer or her property, and the rescuer’s skill and conduct
49
can all be taken into account when valuing a salvage award. The
50
value of labor expended by salvors and their “promptness” may also
51
be considered.
The upper limit of any award is “the value of
whatever property escapes destruction plus whatever freight charge
42. See The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1879) (“Proof of success, to some extent,
is as essential as proof of service, for if the property is not saved, or if it perishes, or,
in case of capture, if it is not retaken, no compensation will be allowed.”); Jarett,
supra note 27, at 780 (noting that recovery requires success or “proximate
contribution to the ultimate success”).
43. Calculating Salvage Liability, supra note 28, at 1897.
44. Id. at 1911.
45. Id.
46. See Davis, supra note 25, at 659 (commenting that the salvor’s property
interest is subject to the payment of the salvage award and subject to “the salvor’s
own duty to care for the property in the same manner as would a reasonable and
prudent owner”).
47. See Jarett, supra note 27, at 781 (adding that the lien accrues immediately
upon the performance of the service).
48. See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869) (“Compensation as salvage
is not viewed by the admiralty courts merely as pay, on the principle of a quantum
meruit . . . but as a reward given for perilous services, voluntarily rendered, and as an
inducement to seamen and others to embark in such undertakings to save life and
property.”); see also Davis, supra note 25, at 660 (arguing that several considerations
are used to determine the amount of salvage awards).
49. See Davis, supra note 25, at 660 n.86 (describing several factors while noting
that although it is a British treatise, “Kennedy’s [Civil Salvage] is frequently cited and
followed in American salvage cases” (citing K. MCGUFFIE, Kennedy’s Civil Salvage 174
(4th ed. 1958))).
50. See Robert A. Long, Jr., Note, A Theory of Hypothetical Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 415,
432 n.110 (1984) (discussing the market for rescue services (citing The Blackwall, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) at 14)).
51. See Calculating Salvage Liability, supra note 28, at 1898 (stating that courts
frequently use the list of factors set forth in The Blackwall when determining salvage
awards (citing The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 14)).
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52

was paid or payable.” In practice, the determination of particular
53
awards is an “unpredictable, erratic process.” Critics have suggested
that such awards are inadequate in that they ignore the opportunity
cost of the rescue effort as well as some of the wear-and-tear on the
rescuing vessel’s components that are not easily measured as an
54
“expense” associated with the rescue.
The authority for granting salvage awards is premised upon the
rescue of property. Under English common law, no salvage awards
55
are permitted merely for rescuing human life.
Where life and
property are saved, the value of the award can be increased based on
the lives saved, but no award is permitted where only “free bodies”
56
are recovered. While English law has evolved to provide expensebased compensation to one who saves a life without saving any
accompanying property, American law has stubbornly clung to the
notion that salvage awards can only be granted where property has
57
been rescued.
2.

Procedure
A claim for a salvage award is brought in rem against the ship or
58
cargo.
Federal district courts have original subject matter
59
jurisdiction over salvage claims. A salvor must bring a claim within
60
two years of providing rescue services.
Regardless of where a rescue occurred, American courts can
exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over a rescued vessel and provide an
appropriate forum for resolution of salvage claims in connection with

52. Id. at 1897.
53. See id. at 1896 (arguing that “judges have invoked a broad array of public
policies and normative principles in defending their decrees,” which results in
dissimilar awards for similar cases).
54. See id. at 1903 (discussing variable costs associated with salvage awards).
55. See Jarett, supra note 27, at 781 (noting that the goal of salvage awards was the
preservation of property).
56. Id. at 781–82.
57. See id. at 783–84 (noting that because slaves were historically considered
property, rescuing slaves could serve as the basis of a salvage award); see also 46 U.S.C.
§ 80107 (2006) (“A salvor of human life . . . is entitled to a fair share of the payment
awarded to the salvor for salvaging the vessel or other property . . . .”).
58. MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SALVAGE 434 (1958).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2006) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled.”); see also THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME
LAW 783 & n.8 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that federal jurisdiction to grant salvage awards
is exclusive because the common law courts “did not recognize the remedy of
compensation in salvage cases”).
60. See 46 U.S.C. § 80107 (making an exception for instances that the plaintiff
could not obtain jurisdiction over the ship within a two-year period).
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rescue of vessels from pirates. So long as the vessel is brought within
the jurisdiction of a court, a salvage award claim could be sought for
services rendered to that vessel.
3.

Related claims in quasi-contract
Outside of the maritime domain, common law has historically been
hostile to awarding restitution to one who provides “unsolicited
62
benefits.” It may be that the common law’s treatment of volunteers
reflects the notion that the non-monetary benefits of being deemed a
“hero” will suffice to motivate and reward rescuers in the nonmaritime context, while “glory-seeking passers-by are unlikely on the
63
high seas.”
Nevertheless, the quasi-contractual notion of “unjust enrichment”
has occasionally been applied to those providing voluntary rescue,
but it requires both that the rescuee be “enriched” and that the
64
enrichment be “unjust” if uncompensated.
According to the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, a person
“who takes effective action to protect another’s property” is entitled
to claim restitution when “the circumstances justify the claimant’s
decision to intervene without a prior agreement” and “it is reasonable
for the claimant to assume that the defendant would wish the action
65
performed.” Restitution awards under this section would be “(i) the
loss avoided by the defendant or (ii) a reasonable charge for
66
the services provided, whichever is less.”
The authors of the
Restatement recognize, however, that such claims are viewed
67
“skeptically.”
The salvage award itself provides the rescuer’s exclusive claim for
recovery of the property imperiled. However, quasi-contract theories

61. See Moyer v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 836 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D.N.J.
1993) (explaining the difficulty of moving a shipwrecked vessel into the territorial
waters of the United States). The quasi in rem jurisdiction of federal courts extends
into international waters. Id.
62. See Long, supra note 50, at 417 (listing the limited instances in which the
common law allowed unsolicited intervenors to recover unsolicited benefits).
63. See Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 103 (1985)
(asserting that the law’s treatment of volunteers reflects a moral consensus that good
and bad deeds should not be regulated by economic incentives).
64. See Long, supra note 50, at 418 (arguing that “unjust enrichment” is a highly
abstract concept requiring clarification).
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2002).
66. Id.
67. See id. cmt. a (differentiating between restitution claims for the protection of
property and those pertaining to life and health).
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can be employed even in maritime rescues to allow recovery of costs
68
associated with rescues that preserve human life.
B. Application to Piracy
69

Piracy is a “danger” sufficient to trigger salvage award rights.
Piracy threatens a vessel or cargo owner’s “possession” just as much as
70
a “peril at sea caused by the elements of nature.” Interpretation of
marine insurance contracts has long held piracy to be one of the
“‘perils of the sea’ . . . even if ‘piracy’ was not specifically
71
mentioned.”
Piracy itself, of course, is a term subject to many
different interpretations, and its definition varies between common
72
law, international law, criminal law, and insurance law. Admiralty
law, however, makes clear that salvage awards are appropriate where a
vessel is “recaptured or retaken from an enemy, pirate or privateer”
and that “[s]ince possession of the owner was displaced by the
usurpation, a restoration of the property to him is just as much a
beneficial service, as recovering it from a peril of the sea caused by
73
the elements of nature.”
However, is the vessel really in “peril” if it is insured fully against
piracy? This question may be of limited utility because not all vessels
have insurance coverage against the risk of piracy, and the
considerable variation in definitions of “piracy” could lead to
74
uncertainty about whether any loss would be covered.
Salvage awards are not available where the “owner of the property
75
to be rescued successfully and properly rejects salvage assistance.”
In order to reject salvage, and thus avoid a salvage award, the owner
of the property must have been in actual possession at the time she
refused salvage, and the rejection must also be one that was
68. See, e.g., Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers,
Inc., 553 F.2d 830, 834–35 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting the argument that quasi-contract
can never apply to maritime rescues).
69. Davis, supra note 25, at 659.
70. Id. at 661 n.90.
71. Passman, supra note 8, at 61 (noting, however, that loss caused by pirates was
traditionally covered under a separate insurance policy).
72. Id. at 61–62.
73. See NORRIS, supra note 58, at 43–44 (explaining that the capture of a vessel by
a hostile power terminates the seamen’s contract with their ship; therefore, if the
seamen succeed in regaining the vessel, they become entitled to a salvage award).
74. See generally Passman, supra note 8 (arguing that gaps in insurance law and
multiple interpretations of “piracy” leave potential coverage gaps under maritime
policies).
75. See David J. Bederman & Brian D. Spielman, Refusing Salvage, 6 LOY. MAR. L.J.
31, 36 (2008) (stating that this is the case even when public policy objectives and
compliance with government regulations and general maritime law requirements are
met).
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consistent with what a prudent owner would have done.
In
addition, the owner must refuse salvage through effective
77
communication and in good faith.
In a piracy context, owners of vessels have, by definition, lost
“actual possession” of the vessel. If the vessel’s crew has surrendered
to pirates, the crew is not capable of remedying the peril in which it
78
finds itself, and therefore is unable to refuse salvage. Arguably, a
vessel owner could only refuse salvage in the form of rescue from
pirates if the pirates were in the course of executing their assault on
the vessel, rather than at the point of having secured control of the
helm. Once the crew of a vessel is incapable of making an effective
rejection, a voluntary salvor “may proceed to preserve the vessel and
79
cargo in expectation of a reward.”
Moreover, to effectively reject a salvage effort, a vessel owner must
act in a way that is consistent with what the prudent vessel owner
would do. The Supreme Court has held that “express acceptance of
the service is not always essential to the validity of the claim. It is
enough if, under the circumstances, any prudent man would have
80
accepted.”
Finally, refusal can be insufficient to bar a salvage award where
81
declining the rescue jeopardizes other interests. When a crew or
cargo is threatened with harm absent rescue, the refusal of a vessel
82
owner to accept salvage will be ineffective. Since pirates threaten
83
crew as well as cargo, it seems unlikely that any vessel owner could

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Hamburg-Am. Line v. United States, 168 F.2d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 1947)
(holding that salvage claims were good, even when forced upon a vessel, because the
crew aboard a sinking ship was not able to meet its peril).
79. See GERARD J. MANGONE, UNITED STATES ADMIRALTY LAW 209 (1997) (adding
that voluntary salvors may also receive a salvage award in cases of abandonment).
80. Bederman & Spielman, supra note 75, at 40 (quoting Merritt & Chapman
Derrick & Wrecking Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 611, 613 (1927)); see also
Tidewater Salvage, Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 633 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cir. 1980)
(“An owner, acting as a prudent person, may refuse salvage assistance by completed
communication to the prospective salvor at any time before the act of salvage.”).
81. See Int’l Aircraft Recovery, L.L.C. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned
Aircraft, 218 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he owner of a vessel in marine
peril [may] decline the assistance of others so long as only the owner’s property
interests are at stake.”); see also Bederman & Spielman, supra note 75, at 43–44
(discussing salvage refusals implicating third-party interests).
82. See Bederman & Spielman, supra note 75, at 44 (emphasizing that judicial
recognition of a prudent owner’s rejection of salvage applies when “only the owner’s
property is in peril”).
83. Somali pirates, for instance, have threatened to kill the crew of captured
ships if their demands are not met. See, e.g., Andrés Cala & Alan Cowell, After 6 Weeks,
Somali Pirates Free Crew of Spanish Vessel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at A10 (reporting

RAPP.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX.THIRD (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

SALVAGE AWARDS ON THE SOMALI COAST

6/22/2010 7:57 PM

1411

effectively reject a salvage offer aimed at recapturing a ship under
pirate control.
II. WHO MIGHT CLAIM AND PAY?
A. Who Might Claim?
1.

Government actors
In practice, much direct counter piracy and antipiracy work is done
by the U.S. Navy. Once primarily a “blue-water” force, Navy doctrine
84
has adjusted to focus on the littoral (coastal) battlefield, providing
the Navy with greater experience in the waters where many modern
pirates operate and a greater likelihood of having forces close at
85
hand when pirates strike.
Salvage awards are only permitted for voluntary rescues. At first
blush, it might seem that governmental actors—in particular the
forces of the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard—would have an existing
duty to rescue that would bar the recovery of such awards by
governmental entities. In fact, however, courts have long held that
the U.S. Navy “should have the same right to claim a salvage award as
86
any other owner of a salving vessel.” Statutory amendments have
confirmed that the Secretary of the Navy “may settle any claim by the
United States for salvage services rendered by the Department of the
87
Navy and may receive payment of any such claim.” Where the Navy
acts to save “distressed property or life at sea,” it acts outside of the
“scope of the usual or expected duty of U.S. Navy personnel and for

that pirates had threatened to kill Spanish crew members unless Spain agreed to
release two pirates captured by the Spanish Navy).
84. See LTJG James Kraska, JAGC, USNR, The U.S. Navy and No-Pay, No-Cure
Salvage Law, 41 NAVAL L. REV. 135, 152 (1993) (describing the Naval operating
environment as the “most congested and hazardous maritime geography during
peacetime and war”).
85. See id. (arguing that, given the Navy’s expansive new strategy, it is ironic that
it still conducts its salvage business “within a legal architecture which is frequently
unacceptable to the providers of emergency salvage”).
86. Landrum, supra note 41, at 216; see also In re American Oil, 417 F.2d 164, 169
(5th Cir. 1969), amended on other grounds by 419 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting that
Congress has expressly authorized the Air Force and Navy to bring salvage claims);
Port Tack Sailboats, Inc. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 597, 606 (S.D. Fla. 1984)
(granting the Navy a lien for its salvage efforts); Schoenbaum, supra note 59, at 788
(arguing that the Navy and other military vessels are entitled to salvage because “such
services are beyond the scope of their official mission” (citing The Impoco, 287 F.
400, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1922)).
87. 10 U.S.C. § 7363(a) (2006); see also 46 U.S.C. § 30916(a) (2006) (“The United
States, and the crew of a merchant vessel owned or operated by the United States . . .
may bring a civil action to recover for salvage services provided by the vessel and
crew.”).
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performing those functions they may be entitled to a salvage award.”
The Coast Guard may also assert salvage claims, but only where its
89
actions are outside of its statutory authority. Where the Coast Guard
simply engages in its ordinary duty “of answering the distress calls of
90
those at sea,” it is not entitled to claim a salvage award.
In spite of its apparent legal right to assert a salvage claim, the
federal government has been reluctant to claim such awards, perhaps
because doing so would appear undignified for the government of a
91
92
nation-state. In The Impoco, a case involving a salvage claim by the
United States for services rendered by an army transport ship, Judge
Ward opined, “[w]hile I can see that a sovereign would and perhaps
should consider it beneath his dignity to ask for compensation for
services in saving property at sea, I can imagine no legal reason to
93
prevent him from doing so.”
Typically, the government limits such claims to recovery of actual
expenses incurred during a rescue effort (rather than the full award
permitted under admiralty law) or in response to suits against the
government by private parties alleging negligence in connection with
94
a rescue effort. The claim for a salvage award may also permit the
government to achieve certain geopolitical objectives, such as laying
claim to the vessel of a nation with which the United States is not at
95
war.
The Coast Guard, by contrast, does not have strong justification for
96
entitlement to a salvage award. The statutes permitting the Navy to
97
seek salvage awards make no mention of the Coast Guard (which is

88. NORRIS, supra note 58, at 128.
89. See United States v. EX-USS Cabot/Dedalo, 297 F.3d 378, 386 (5th Cir. 2002)
(holding that various statutory provisions made it “abundantly clear” that the Coast
Guard’s duty was mandatory, not optional, and therefore the Coast Guard could not
make a salvage claim).
90. See Parent, supra note 30, at 100–01 (elaborating that salvage claim may
prevail if the service rendered is outside the normal scope of employment).
91. See Landrum, supra note 41, at 217 (noting how The Impoco court’s comment
that “asking for compensation was beneath the dignity of the sovereign” might
have discouraged the claims). But see FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR.,
ADMIRALTY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 135 (4th ed. 2001) (“The Navy often claims salvage
awards.”).
92. 287 F. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
93. Id. at 402.
94. See Landrum, supra note 41, at 218 (noting that, in these cases, the courts
have not granted awards per se, but have instead used the claim for salvage only as an
offset or not at all).
95. Id. at 218 & n.38 (citing NORRIS, supra note 58, at 131) (suggesting that the
government did so in one instance to arrest a German ship prior to the United States
entering the Second World War).
96. Id. at 220.
97. Id.
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not a component of the Department of the Navy during times of
peace). Moreover, the statutes specifying the powers and duties of
the Coast Guard impose duties to provide maritime rescue, possibly
negating the “voluntary” nature of a rescue—a requirement for a
98
salvage award—on the part of the Coast Guard.
Some courts,
however, have suggested that these statutory provisions should be
read as permissive and thus that the Coast Guard should be able to
99
seek salvage awards.
A number of policy arguments can be advanced against permitting
the government to claim a salvage award. These arguments would
likely resemble those put forth to justify the anachronistic
100
and arguably ethnically-biased “Firefighter’s Rule,” which bars
firefighters and other professional rescuers from suing the parties
whose negligence necessitated a rescue when the rescuer suffers an
101
injury. Part of the rationale prohibiting professional rescuers from
obtaining monetary awards for injuries is that tax receipts finance
government-funded rescue agencies, and a separate salvage award
102
could impose “double taxation” on the party rescued.
This
103
argument would not apply to foreign-flagged vessels, which would
receive a windfall from being rescued by the naval forces of another
104
country.
Another argument against allowing the government to claim
salvage awards might be that no such award is needed to incentivize

98. Id.; see also MANGONE, supra note 79, at 211 (“[W]hen the [Coast Guard] is
acting within the call of its duty it may receive no salvage award.”).
99. See Landrum, supra note 41, at 221–22 (citing In re American Oil Co., 417
F.2d 164, 167–70 (5th Cir. 1969)) (explaining that the American Oil court viewed the
United States’ decision not to pursue a salvage award for Coast Guard services as a
policy decision rather than an understanding that the government was precluded
from doing so).
100. In a forthcoming article, I plan to argue that the Firefighter’s Rule has been
preserved as a form of workplace “primary assumption of risk” even as that doctrine
has been disfavored in the workplace throughout the last century. One reason for
the continued survival of this rule is that firefighters have historically been members
of ethnic and religious groups frequently discriminated against (most commonly
Irish Catholics), while property owners have been members of more dominant
ethnic groups and economic classes.
101. See generally Ouachita Wilderness Inst., Inc. v. Mergen, 947 S.W.2d 780, 784
(Ark. 1997) (explaining that the policy considerations motivating the Fireman’s Rule
stem from the dangerous purpose of the profession).
102. See Landrum, supra note 41, at 229 (exploring whether Naval and Coast
Guard rescues should be considered public functions).
103. Id.
104. Arguably, receiving benefits while bearing less of the cost could incentivize
U.S. ships to seek “foreign” affiliations. See id. (“Of course, foreign ships would then
receive the benefits while bearing less of the cost.”).
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government actors (in comparison to private rescuers).
However,
where wartime needs stretch defense budgets thin, some guarantee
that operational expenses could be recovered might encourage more
aggressive intervention by military and civilian coastal defense and
patrol forces. One might also deploy the usual “flood of litigation”
argument, pointing out that government rescues are common and
arguing that salvage claims could burden court dockets. However,
any argument that substantive doctrine should be affected by
106
concerns over litigation volume ought to be viewed with suspicion.
2.

Private “vigilante” crews
In addition to governmental actors, private salvors are also entitled
to claim salvage awards for providing voluntary maritime rescue. This
becomes increasingly important given that the high value of freight
vessels (and their cargoes) seized by Somali pirates may entice private
107
actors to enter the business of antipiracy.
International law considerations may prove to be relevant in
evaluating the legality of private rescuers’ conduct. For example,
private pirate-hunting vigilantes could run afoul of United Nations
Conventions limiting antipiracy efforts to nation-states. An Internet
posting recently detailed a reported offer by a Russian cruise line of
108
“pirate-hunting vacations.”
Eugene Kontorovich responded to the
posting, stating that Article 107 of the United Nations Convention on
109
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) allows only “warships” to seize
pirates, implying that private antipiracy efforts could violate UNCLOS
110
and expose such actors to prosecution as pirates themselves.

105. See id. (adding that parties rescued by the government will receive a windfall,
where parties rescued by private actors will be required to pay).
106. In a forthcoming article, I plan to explore the use of the “floodgates”
metaphor in American tort jurisprudence, from an empirical and literary studies
perspective.
107. See Carolyn Liss, Private Security Companies in the Fight Against Piracy in Asia, in
PIRACY, TERRORISM AND SECURING THE MALACCA STRAITS 103, 111 (Graham Gerard
Ong-Webb ed., 2006) (discussing the increased demand and availability of private
security companies in the Asian maritime sector).
108. Posting of Kenneth Anderson to Opinio Juris,
http://opiniojuris.org/2009/07/01/a-pirate-hunting-vacation/ (July 1, 2009, 16:27
EST).
109. Article 107 provides that “[a] seizure on account of piracy may be carried out
only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and
identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect.” United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 107, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
110. Posting of Eugene Kontorovich to Opinio Juris,
http://opiniojuris.org/2009/07/01/a-pirate-hunting-vacation/ (July 1, 2009, 18:25
EST).
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However, private actors might not need to concern themselves with
being labeled pirates according to the UNCLOS definition of piracy.
UNCLOS defines piracy as “illegal acts of violence or detention . . .
committed for private ends . . . on the high seas . . . against a ship . . .
111
in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”
Ships held by
pirates in Somali ports, for instance, would fall under the jurisdiction
of Somalia, so seizing such ships would arguably violate Somali
criminal law rather than the international law of the sea. Moreover,
rescue efforts launched by private actors would not be directed
“against a ship” but rather for the sake of the wrongfully detained
112
ship.
Finally, lax enforcement of maritime laws may give private
antipiracy firms confidence that they are unlikely to face prosecution
113
for activities of questionable legality.
Regardless of the legal framework in which they might operate,
private security firms have begun to offer maritime protection to
114
potential shipping clients. Private security companies “offer a wide
115
For
selection of services” to address “different kinds of piracy.”
116
example, the former “Blackwater” firm, now known as Xe, “is
marketing a sophisticated suite of over-the-horizon indication and
117
warning capabilities designed to help vessels avoid trouble.”
This
includes deploying the “183-foot MacArthur, a reconfigured vessel of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration with a range
118
of 7,000 nautical miles . . . [and] helicopter capability.”
Another

111. UNCLOS, supra note 109, art. 101.
112. Therefore, because private salvors are not acting “against the ship,” they
would not be considered pirates under the definition set forth by UNCLOS. Id.
113. See Liss, supra note 107, at 114 (claiming that the inability of governments to
oversee the seas creates opportunities for private security companies to engage in
illegal activities).
114. See James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Repressing Piracy in the 21st Century: An
International Maritime Threat Response Plan, 40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 43, 48 (2009)
(“Companies are working to quickly fill an emerging security demand.”).
115. Liss, supra note 107, at 112–13.
116. The firm changed its name after “Blackwater” became “radioactive” due to
accusations that security contractors employed by the firm had massacred Iraqi
civilians in 2007. See CNN: The Situation Room (CNN television broadcast Aug. 22,
2009) (transcript on file with the American University Law Review) (reporting that
Xe still has a number of government contracts). The new name, Xe, is the symbol
on the periodic table of elements for Xenon, selected because it is an inert gas that is
virtually undetectable, as the newly monikered firm hopes to be. Id. As Newsweek
magazine wrote, “It’s a classic trick for a company suffering through public disgrace:
change your name. The latest example is Blackwater.” Sorry, Don’t Know Anyone by
That Name, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 2, 2009, at 9. Whether the name change will result in a
successful rebranding of the company is still in doubt. See Kristen Collins, The Name
is Xe. Just Xe., NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 14, 2009, at 1A.
117. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 114, at 47.
118. Id.
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firm has been hired by the Somali government to fight piracy in the
119
nation’s coastal waters.
The possibility that private firms will see significant monetary
opportunity in connection with engaging in rescues of vessels seized
by Somali pirates may raise some troubling concerns. During their
recent experience on the ground in Iraq, private security firms have
often appeared to act without the restraint associated with
120
governmental armed forces. Xe, now a potential industry leader in
private anti-piracy efforts, in particular has been accused of crimes
against Iraqi citizens. While known as Blackwater, the firm was
involved in 200 shooting incidents in Iraq, and in 2007 its employees
were accused of killing seventeen innocent civilians, leading to
121
manslaughter charges against six employees of the firm. The firm
122
Should it branch from
has now been expelled from that country.
providing warning of pirate activity to providing armed recapture of
seized vessels, Xe might demonstrate the kind of disregard for human
life that attracted critics in Iraq. Moreover, pirates might find
themselves subject to a policy of “shoot first and ask questions later.”
A greater concern is that because the payoff in the form of a
salvage award derives primarily from the value of the property saved,
a profit-maximizing vigilante firm might choose to place recovery of a
123
vessel above the safety or security of the captured crew.
Governments have checks and balances in place that private security
firms do not, including accountability to voters and the obligation to
124
adhere to customary international law.
Additionally, a large
number of private antipiracy firms operating near the Horn of Africa
would complicate governmental operations, reduce the certainty that
governments could recover salvage awards for their efforts, and might
therefore reduce the likelihood of military and official action to
rescue captured crews and vessels from pirates. Therefore, to
119. See US firm to fight Somali pirates, BBC NEWS, Nov. 25, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4471536.stm (describing the role Topcat Marine
Security will play in defending Somalia’s territorial waters).
120. See Collins, supra note 116, at 1A (discussing allegations against Blackwater
during its involvement in Iraq, including numerous shootings and the use of
unarmored vehicles to save money).
121. Id.
122. See id. (stating that the serious allegations regarding Blackwater’s conduct led
to a decision by Iraqi officials to prohibit Blackwater from operating in Iraq).
123. See Parent, supra note 30, at 117 (recognizing financial incentives that could
negatively affect the motivation of otherwise well-intentioned salvors).
124. See Karolina Milewicz, Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalization: Toward a
Conceptual Framework, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 413, 426–27 (2009) (discussing
the rule of law and comparing checks and balances to formal international law as
similar limits on political power).
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preserve government involvement in salvage efforts, it might be
necessary to limit the freedom of private firms.
B. Who Might Pay?
1.

Vessel and cargo owners
Anyone “involved in the common venture must pay its
125
proportionate share of the award.” Vessel owners, as well as “cargo
126
interests,” may be obliged to contribute to a salvage award. Cargo
127
owners are liable for whatever sum is decreed by an admiralty court.
Generally speaking, cargo owners are not required to cover salvage
128
However, courts will
costs paid for cargo other than their own.
generally “apportion the award as between the vessel and cargo on a
129
pro rata basis.”
Under this precedent, cargo owners would pay
130
their percentage of the value of the saved cargo.
2.

Insurers
Under most American-issued hull insurance policies, a vessel owner
is entitled to insurance coverage for any salvage award he or she is
131
forced to pay.
In other words, if the vessel is recovered from a
maritime peril—and the insurer avoids having to pay out to cover a
loss of the vessel—labor and other costs associated with salvage
(though perhaps not the entire award) may be covered. In contrast,
in the event that the salvage/rescue effort is unsuccessful, no such
labor costs would be paid; of course, if the efforts were not at least a
132
partial success, no salvage award would be imposed either.

125. FORCE, supra note 29, at 159.
126. Id.
127. See NORRIS, supra note 58, at 331 (noting the possibility that parties may settle
the salvage claim out of court).
128. See Spencer, supra note 6, at 1244 (“[C]argo insurers have guaranteed the
payment of such special charges as are determined to be properly due in respect of
the goods.”).
129. NORRIS, supra note 58, at 334 (citation omitted).
130. Id.
131. Spencer, supra note 6, at 1230, citing Am. Inst. of Marine Underwriters,
American
Institute
Hull
Clauses
(June
2,
1977),
available
at
http:/www.aimu.org/aimuforms/7.pdf; see also THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, KEY
DIVERGENCES BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW OF MARINE INSURANCE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 5 (1999) (“The basic hull insurance policy covers the vessel, her
machinery, and certain liabilities for collision as well as general average and salvage
charges.”). Complications can arise, however, if the salvage award is connected with
a “total loss” of the vessel. See Spencer, supra note 6, at 1230 (discussing the
complications of a “total loss” on insurance coverage and the extension of coverage
in those situations).
132. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
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3.

Nation-states
Salvage actions are in rem actions that impose a lien on the vessel
133
recovered. The only parties liable to pay in the action itself are the
134
Insurance companies are, by contract,
vessel and cargo owners.
135
potential sources of funds to pay salvage awards.
Once a vessel or
cargo owner has been compelled to pay a salvage award, however, the
vessel owner might seek to identify other responsible parties and seek
to recover from those who caused the vessel to be subject to a salvage
136
award. It might be possible to articulate claims against nations that
have harbored pirates, alleging that their actions caused the salvage
award liability that vessel owners may face after being rescued by
public or private actors. While the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) provides foreign nation-states with general immunity from
claims for damages in U.S. courts, it carves out an exception for
137
“certain acts of state sponsored terrorism.”
To the extent that
piracy is equated with terrorism, and to the extent that states harbor
pirates or sponsor pirate activities, claims might be viable in spite of
the general immunity provided by FSIA. Actions under FSIA’s state
sponsored terror exception generally require that the U.S.
Department of State designate the nation as a state sponsor of
138
terrorism. Currently, only four nations are on that list, and Somalia
139
is not included.
The primary obstacle to recovering any form of damages from
governments that harbor or facilitate pirate activities is that most of
these governments have extremely limited fiscal and public resources.
133. See Patrick J. Long, Comment, The Good Samaritan and Admiralty: A Parable of
a Statute Lost at Sea, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 591, 602 (2000) (describing the historical roots
of the in rem requirement (citing The Fusilier, 16 Eng. Rep. 19, 21 (1865))).
134. See supra notes 127–130 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 131–132 and accompanying text.
136. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 illus. 11
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) (presenting a scenario where the shipowner can
implead the party causing the accident and allow the salvor to obtain damages
against that other party); see also Tice Towing Line v. James McWilliams Blue Line, 51
F.2d 243, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) modified, 57 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding that a
party whose negligence causes a vessel to incur salvage liability is liable for such
salvage costs).
137. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2006) (enumerating situations where foreign
states are not immune from the jurisdiction of American courts); Kristine Cordier
Karnezis, Annotation, Award of Damages Under State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception to
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 182 A.L.R. FED. 1 (2002) (discussing situations where
the exception has been used to establish jurisdictions in American courts).
138. See United States Dep’t of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism,
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (listing “[c]ountries determined by the
Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism”) (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
139. See id. (listing Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria as the nations designated as state
sponsors of terrorism).
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This is also precisely the reason those governments are unable to
combat pirate gangs or are vulnerable to bribery and manipulation by
well-funded (or at least high liquidity) sea bandits.
III. EMERGING STATE RESCUE-COST RECOVERY LAWS
Salvage law has long provided financial benefits to those who
provide maritime rescue services. Until recently, those who provide
rescues on land have not been entitled to any form of compensation
for their services, except where such compensation is governed by
140
contract.
Two developments have led to a shift in the treatment of landbased rescuers, creating the possibility of recovery for governmental
actors providing rescues on land. The first development is the
141
widespread strain on governmental resources.
State and local
governmental authorities have faced budget shortfalls for years, and
the costs of rescue are increasingly viewed as a potential revenue
142
strain.
Second, as sports like mountain climbing and other
wilderness activities increase in popularity, increasing numbers of
Americans are entering previously underexplored terrain and finding
143
themselves in need of expensive search and rescue assistance, often
requiring the use of pricey equipment while exposing rescue
personnel to significant physical danger. From a political economy
perspective, it is no surprise that local governments have started to
find ways to impose rescue costs on tourists (often non-residents)
rather than leaving rescue expenses on the shoulders of local
144
government entities—and by extension on local taxpayers.

140. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 147–150 and accompanying text (discussing recent state
legislative efforts to reimburse entities that conduct search and rescue operations on
land or sea).
142. See, e.g., Rosemary Shinohara, City Trims Fire Department’s Specialty Services to
Save Cash, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 24, 2010 (reporting Anchorage’s decision
to disband a number of the fire department’s special programs, including
the wilderness rescue team, to save $150,000), available at
http://www.adn.com/2010/02/23/1154005/fire-department-reduces-services.html.
143. See Travis W. Heggie & Tracey M. Heggie, Search and Rescue Trends Associated
With Recreational Travel in US National Parks, 16 J. TRAVEL MED. 23, 23 (2009) (“As
more and more tourists pursue their leisure endeavors in environments such as
national parks, it is inevitable that the medical community and [search and rescue]
organizations will have to deal with an increasing number of lost, ill, and injured
tourists. They will also have to deal with the increasing costs of [search and rescue]
operations.”).
144. See Bill Hedden, The Monument in a Changing West, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 535, 536 (2001) (“Possibly, the worst product of industrial tourism is the
person who gets lost in the backcountry, imposes the costs of a massive search and
rescue on the local people, and then sues.”).
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Although similar salvage rights have not traditionally allowed those
who provide rescues on land to recover any monetary award for
145
successful rescues, recent statutory initiatives in various American
states have sought to provide some right to recovery for rescuers,
typically for the costs associated with rescue. The common law’s “free
public services doctrine” ordinarily bars governmental actors from
146
seeking to recover rescue costs from those in danger, but various
statutes have carved out important exceptions.
Such statutes generally have two dimensions: who is subject to a
government claim for reimbursement and what types of expenses
can be recovered. Regarding who is subject to a claim for
reimbursement, states have typically taken three approaches. First,
some statutes allow recovery by governmental authorities for any
government rescue. For example, in Maine rescue costs are
recoverable regardless of whether the person rescued was negligent
147
or not.
A second approach established by some statutes allows
recovery only where those in need of rescue trespassed onto closed
land or ignored posted warnings. For instance, Hawaii recently
enacted a Search and Rescue Reimbursement Act, which imposes
148
rescue costs on those who ignore posted warnings and allows the
government to bring a cause of action against a person who
149
benefitted from the rescue efforts.
The statute aims to offset the
significant costs of search and rescue as well as to preserve the life
150
and safety of those involved in the rescue. Similarly, in California,
any person who enters an area closed to the public “or an area that a
reasonable person under the circumstances should have known was
145. See Stephen F. Friedell, Compensation and Reward for Saving Life at Sea, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1218, 1221 n.8 (1979) (“Generally, one who saves the property of
another on land without the request of the owner to do so is denied any
compensation, even if he expected to be compensated.”); M.B.W. Sinclair, The Cherry
Valley Case: How Wrong Can Economists Be About Salvage?, 31 TULANE MAR. L.J. 57, 70–
71 (2006) (“[I]t is remarkable that there should be salvage awards in our maritime
law; were a similar act of salvage performed on land, our courts would not give an
award to the rescuer, but would rather regard him as a mere volunteer or an
officious intermeddler.”).
146. See generally Michael I. Krauss, Public Services Meet Private Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1, 33–46 (2007) (defending the free public services doctrine).
147. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 10105 (2004) (“The commissioner may recover
all costs directly related to a specific search and rescue operation . . . .”).
148. Search & Rescue Reimbursement Act (Act 66), HAW. REV. STAT. § 137-1
(2009); see also Renee Furuta, Recent Development, 1999 Hawai’i Legislation Update,
22 U. HAW. L. REV. 323, 334–35 (2000) (discussing the scope and implications of the
Search & Rescue Reimbursement Act).
149. See Furuta, supra note 148, at 335 (listing the entities against whom the
government may bring suit to seek reimbursement, including an individual’s
guardian or estate).
150. Id. at 334.
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closed to the public” is liable to the government, for-profit entities, or
151
not-for-profit entities that provide an appropriate response. Finally,
some statutes allow recovery only against adventurers who acted in a
negligent manner prior to the circumstances necessitating rescue.
New Hampshire’s provision allows recovery from any person who
negligently necessitated rescue, providing that “any person
determined by the [Fish and Game] department to have acted
negligently in requiring a search and rescue response by the
department shall be liable . . . for the reasonable cost of the
152
department’s expenses for such search and rescue response.”
The second dimension along which these statutes vary has to do
with the kinds of expenses that are recoverable. In some states, such
as Hawaii, actual fuel costs, equipment costs, and wages of rescue
153
workers are specifically mentioned as recoverable.
In California,
recoverable expenses include the cost of services and the salaries of
154
emergency personnel.
Idaho has a similar provision, though it
155
limits liability to $4000 in expenses for a single incident.
In other states, legislation imposes an obligation on the person
rescued to compensate any person injured in the course of a rescue
(whether or not such an obligation could be crafted under state
common law). Hawaii’s statute, for instance, includes a catchall
recovery for “‘any and all other expenses relating to a search and
rescue operation’ to cover any remaining costs that were not
156
specifically enumerated.”
These statutes reflect growing policy recognition that the costs of
rescue efforts are significant and strain limited governmental
157
resources.
Efforts by local governments to recover expenses
associated with rescuing citizens belie the notion that asking for
158
reimbursement is “beneath the dignity of the sovereign,” which has
been offered as an explanation of why governmental actors rarely
151. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53159 (West Supp. 2010).
152. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 206:26-bb (Supp. 2009).
153. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-1 (LexisNexis 2006) (defining search and
rescue expenses).
154. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53159(a)(1) (“‘Expenses of an emergency response’
. . . include the cost of providing police, firefighting, search and rescue, and
emergency medical services at the scene of an incident, and salaries of the persons
who respond to the incident . . . .”).
155. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-2401 (2004).
156. Furuta, supra note 148, at 334 (citing Search & Rescue Reimbursement Act
(Act 66), § 2, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 137-1–3 (2009)).
157. See id. (detailing the policy rationale motivating the passage of the Hawaii
Search and Rescue Reimbursement Act).
158. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons that
governments have not traditionally pursued salvage claims).
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seek recovery by way of a maritime salvage award.
The costs of
antipiracy rescues carried out by the U.S. Navy are difficult to
estimate, given the secrecy that typically surrounds the management
160
of special operations forces’ budgets.
Surely, the costs of such
operations meet or exceed the cost of land-based rescues, particularly
if the expenses associated with training operators are taken into
161
account.
However, none of the state laws allowing recovery of rescue
expenses go so far as to award a share of property recovered in a
rescue to the rescuing agency, as is possible under the law of
maritime salvage awards. Several explanations for this discrepancy
may exist. For one, land rescue typically targets saving human life,
and adventurers in the wilderness rarely have property of comparable
value to that of maritime vessels, which can be factored into rescue
162
expenditures. In addition, it may be that while the risks associated
with land rescue are high and the opportunities to contract for
agreed upon rescue-service pricing are difficult to find, they still do
not equate to the dangers and transaction costs present in the
163
maritime domain.
CONCLUSION
Salvage awards have long been praised in legal scholarship as an
example of an economically efficient approach to promoting rescue,
particularly because of the high transaction costs associated with
164
negotiated rescue contracts in the maritime setting.
Government
resources to provide rescue across the vast expanse of ocean are
limited, and salvage awards increase the number and enthusiasm of

159. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
160. See David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 274 n.51 (2010)
(recognizing the intelligence budget as an example of congressional secrecy).
161. It costs as much as $500,000 to train a Navy SEAL such as those who rescued
Captain Richard Phillips from Somali pirates last year. Stephanie Gaskell, Years of
Training Go Into One Shot, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 14, 2009, at 8.
162. See Ross A. Albert, Comment, Restitutionary Recovery for Rescuers of Human Life,
74 CAL. L. REV. 85, 113 (1986) (explaining the way that the historical nature of
salvage awards as in rem proceedings affects restitutionary remedies for life rescuers).
163. See Parent, supra note 30, at 111 (“[R]escue at sea generally involves greater
risk to both rescuer and rescued, greater chance of hardship or death if a first
attempt is unsuccessful and greater expense to the rescuer.”).
164. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 34, at 100–03 (discussing six factors that
determine the amount of a salvage award and likewise contribute to a salvor’s
decision to rescue a ship); Calculating Salvage Liability, supra note 28, at 1899
(claiming that salvage awards are the most efficient tool to promote maritime
salvage).
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165

potential salvors. Salvage awards for those who rescue mariners and
vessels from Somali pirates might also have favorable effects in
disincentivizing shipping companies from sending their crews and
fleets into high piracy waterways.
However, private antipiracy efforts could potentially raise legal and
safety concerns. Pirates could become more aggressive in response,
and “[l]ives could be lost, cargo damaged and vessels might be set on
166
fire.”
Nevertheless, the common law of salvage awards provides a
remedy that creates the possibility for rescue costs to be borne by
vessel and cargo owners. Only time and experience will determine
whether increasing the rate at which such awards are sought
produces policy gain or ill.

165. See Calculating Salvage Liability, supra note 28, at 1900 (arguing that awarding
private parties is the most efficient method to reduce burdens on the government
and ensure salvage efforts are conducted).
166. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 114, at 47.

